



# A Case for An Integrated Policy Framework

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*Gita Gopinath*  
*IMF Economic Counsellor*


*\* This presentation is based on preliminary work at the IMF Research Department.*

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# Countries have used various policy tools for macro management


## Inflow Episode

**Number of macroprudential and capital flow management measures, 2010-11**  
(number of measures)




## Outflow Episode

**Policy rates changes since March 2018**  
(percentage points)




**Change of Reserves, March-October 2018**  
(cumulative, percent of GDP)




Sources: Alam and Others (2019), Haver Analytics; and Bloomberg, L.P., IMF BOP, and IMF staff estimates.

# Country characteristics vary along several dimensions


**Currency of export invoicing**  
(percent of total)



**Non-financial corporate foreign currency debt**  
(in percent of GDP, 2018)




**FX market turnover**  
(in percent of GDP, 2016)




Sources: Gopinath (2016), IMF, and BIS.

# Modeling an integrated policy framework



# Model ingredients

- A micro-founded small open economy: tradable goods, sticky prices, producer currency pricing (PCP) or dominant currency pricing (DCP)
- Policy tools: integrate **monetary policy**, **capital controls** and **FXI**



# Policy trade-offs

**Flexible exchange rates**

**Benefits**

Expenditure switching but weaker under DCP

**Costs**

Negative balance sheet effect and risk of binding borrowing constraint in case of depreciation

**Capital controls**

**Benefits**

Prevent overborrowing and alter debt/consumption profiles

**Costs**

Distort capital flows

**FX intervention**

**Benefits**

Can free up monetary policy by affecting the exchange rate separately

**Costs**

Carry cost

## Remark 1: Not all instruments affect all imperfections

**Shock: Real (productivity) shock**

**Country characteristics: Dominant currency pricing, deep FX markets**



Despite output gap, there is **no case for capital controls or FX intervention**:

- Imperfect stabilization arises from stickiness of price in dominant currency, **not** from overborrowing

## Remark 2: Instruments typically affect multiple imperfections

**Shock: Financial (debt-limit) shock**

**Country characteristics: Dominant currency pricing, deep FX market**



**Monetary policy:  
stimulate the economy  
and defend the ER**

**Prudential policy** ( $t = 0$ ):

- Impose capital controls, which may lead to higher post-shock policy rate

**Prudential CC > 0**



**Monetary policy:  
less need to stimulate,  
less need to defend the ER**



# Country characteristics matter

## Country Characteristics

PCP/DCP  
Commodity exporter  
Deep FX markets

## Shocks

Productivity  
Commodity price  
World interest rate

## Policies (preliminary)

Mundell-Fleming prescription

FX mismatch  
Shallow FX markets

Debt limit  
Capital flows

Role for capital controls/FXI

# Five broad principles

1. Not just the number but the workings of instruments matter.
  - **Not all instruments affect all imperfections.**
  - **Instruments typically affect multiple imperfections.**
2. PCP countries receive greater benefits from exchange rate flexibility. Since exchange rate adjustment is a weaker tool, DCP countries achieve less macro stabilization and may need larger exchange rate movements.
3. DCP alone does not change the M-F prescription.
4. Prudential capital controls can help when there is a possibility of not being able to borrow. DCP countries impose higher capital controls because of the larger exchange rate movements desired based on trade considerations.
5. FX intervention can increase monetary autonomy when foreign exchange markets are shallow and monetary transmission channel is at least partially functional.

**In practice** incorporating multiple objectives and tools into monetary policy frameworks is likely to be challenging. Clear communication is key in safeguarding efficacy and credibility of monetary policy.